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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION --- THE QUESTION INVOLVED.
A case involving contributory negligence presents
the question of what a person ought or ought not to
have done under the circumstances of the particular
case. Such an issue affords the basis for the appli-
cation of the principle that every person shall hirr.-
self bear whatever injury he brings upon himself. To
guard against the unreasonableness of persons being
allowed to protect themselves from responsibility for
their negligent acts, the general view was adopted as
to the harm the person brings upon himself, that if the
plaintiff, or party injured might have avoided the
consequences of the dedendant's negligence by the exer-
cise of ordinary care, but did not, the law will leave
the consequences to rest upon that wrong doer upon
whom they chance to fall.
The difficulty of dealing with the question of
the onus in cases of the above description arises from
the fact that in most cases it is almost impossible
for the plaintiff to lay his evidence before a jury or
court in order to trace the fault for his injury to
the defendant, without disclosinr such circumstances,
that either impute or tend to rebut the conclusion
that the fault was mutual and the plaintiff according-
ly guilty or not guilty of contributory negligence
There are, morever, three classes of cases under
which are to be considered the question upon whom the
onus probandi actually rests. Accordingly then,
whether the plaintiff is bound to prove, as part of
his case, his freedom from contributory neglience, we
must proceed to consider each proposition as set forth
in the following classification. First. In these
cases, as it appears to our minds, there is no es-
sential difference between the negligence of a defend-
ant which may render him liable in an action of this
kind, and the contributory negligence of a plaintiff
which may disprove his right to recover. The very
phrase contributory negligence implies that the latter
is of the same intrinsic nature and contributes to
cause the same effect as the former. The law presumes
every one to have been diligent, or free from negli-
gence until affirmative evidence of negligence is
given, and does not, on the contrary, in the absence
3of direct or circumstantial evidence, ever presume any
party to have been guilty of negligence. Hence to
warrant a verdict against the defendant on the ground
of his negligence, the law merely requires that his
negligence shall be affirmatively shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and places upon the defendant
the burden of showing the negligence of the plaintiff
contributing to the injury where such contributory
negligence is relied upon as a ground of defense. Of
course a plaintiff who pursues an unfounded action,
and as it sometimes happens, is confronted with evi-
dence elicited from his own witnessestendtng to show
contributory negligence on his part, may have to sub-
mit to the defendant's use of such testimony unless it
be contradicted or rebutted by counter-evidence point-
ing toward plaintiff's diligence or freedom from neg-
ligence. But this does not and cannot affect the
correctness of the rule, that contributory negligence
is a matter to be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, the same as any other negligence, and that
in the absence of evidence it is not to be presumed.
But in another class of cases it is said that the
cause of action consists in an act or omission, in-
4volving not only negligence in the defendant, but the
exercise of proper care by the injured party. This
duty of care thus presupposed to be imposed upon the
defendant for the protection of the other, is said not
to be established, until the plaintiff has first shown
his own relative position and performed the burden
resting upon him of showing affirmatively the exercise
of due and proper care on his part. In this view the
absence of contributory negligence becomes a part of
the plaintiff's case and should appear before the de-
fendant can be called upon to answer the negligence
imputed to himself. That such requirement does not
impose upon the plaintiff the proving of a negative is
contended b, the courts holding such doctrine,on the
ground that he is merely bound to show the duty he
counts upon and the breach of it for which he sues.
The third class, briefly noticed, may be said to
state the matter thus : In the absence of evidence of
contributory negligence on part of plaintiff, there is
no presumption either way as to his exercise of care
or the want of it on his part. Perhaps the matter may
be stated more clearly and logically if we should say
that as in the absence of facts showing a duty of
5care, the plaintiff is saved from giving evidence of
such care, so the presence of facts tending to show a
duty of care places the burden on the plaintiff to
present some evidence from which the jury may infer
that he exercised it.
CHAPTER II
E1GLISH DOCTRINE
Section I. At the Common Law after Butterfield v.
Forrester
Sub. I. The first recorded reference to the
Rule. The impression seems to have prevailed to
some extent that the court in the case of Butterfield
v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, held that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover in an action for
negligence without showing affirmatively that the in-
jury was not the result of his own negligence ; that
he would have to first establish the absence of con-
tributory negligence upon his part. This case, the
earliest leading case upon the subject of contribu-
tory negligence and the first to formulate a specific
rule in connection with that subject, can not, in my
opinion, be said to have so declared the law, nor,
moreover, that it intended to hold such doctrine.
Sub. 2. The same: Lord Ellenborough's opinion.
Such an intimation, I suppose, was inferred from the
following language employed by Lord Elleriborough who
delivered the opinion in the case :
"A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruc-
tion which has been made by the fault of another and
avail himself of it, if he does not himself use com-
mon and ordinary caution to be in the right. One
person being in fault will not dispense with another's
using ordinary care for himself. Two thins must con
cur to support this action, an obstruction in the
road by default of the defendant, and no want of ordi-
nary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff."
Sub. 3. The case considered. A casual obser-
vation of this language might justify the'impression
referred to supra ; but when considered in connection
with the facts of that case and with other portions
of the opinion, it would hardly be warranted. The
plaintiff in the case referred to, while riding
violently in a public highway about eight o'clock in
the evening was injured by being thrown from his horse
which he had guided against a pole placed across the
road by the defendant. When the plaintiff attempt-
ed to prove his cause of action upon the trial it ap-
peared upon his own showing that had he been riding
at an ordinary pace or with ordinary care he could
have avoided the obstruction since there was light
enough at the time to discern it at a hundred yards
distance. It will be seen that the injury to the
plaintiff in that case was the result of his own di-
rect act and the court, being of the opinion that the
riding at the rapid pace under the circumstances as
mentioned was carelessness upon his part which con-
tributed to the injury, non-suited him. It is very
evident to my mind that the language of the opinion
referred to was intended to apply to the state of
facts mentioned and not to lay down any general rule
that would be applicable to any state of facts that
might appear in that character of cases. There was,
to say the least, gross negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, and accordingly Butterfield v. Forrester
can not be justifiably cited as authority for the
rule that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff
to show his freedom from contributory negligence.
Sub. 4. Later cases : In neither of the cases
of Gough v. Bryan, 2 Mees.& Welsb. 790 and Bridge v.
the Grand Junction R.R. Co. 3 I4. & W. 244, did the
declaration contain an averment that the accident hap-
pened without any want of ordinary care on the part
of the plaintiff and yet the plaintiff was allowed to
recover damages for accidental injuries, a plea which
set up in a defective form, the negligence of the
plaintiffbeing held bad upon demurrer. If any such
burden lay upon the plaintiff it would certainly have
been necessary for him in those days when pleadings
were required to be very precise and accurate, to
allege in his declaration that the accident happened
without any such negligence on his own part as con-
tributed to cause it. And, moreover, no such declar-
ation is to be seen in any of the cases of this gen-
eral character. Both in pleading and practice in
England the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
has always been dealt with as if it was a separate
issue from that of the defendant's negligence, and
has always been so presented to the jury, the judge
directing that the affirmative lay upon the defend-
ants. The earliest statement of the rule appears in
the case of Dublin, Wicklow & Wexford Railway Company
v. Slattery reported in 3 app. cases 1169, where Lord
Hatherly and Lord Penzance hold the opinion that,
whether the question of such contributory negligence
arises on a plea of "not guilty" or is made the sub-
ject of a counter issue, it is substantially a mat-
ter of defense, and the other Lords who took part in
the decision said nothing to the contrary. "That
plea, equally, in my opinion," says Lord Penzance,
"casts upon the defendant the burden of establishing
the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Of course
I do not mean that this must be done by evidence pro-
duced by the defendants. The plaintiff may in the
course of his own case produce evidence by which his
own negligence, as causing the accident may plainly
appear. But what I intend to say is that the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff must be estab-
lished affirmatively, and that the absence of evi-
dence to negative any such negligence will not entitle
the defendants to a verdict as it would do, if the
burden of proving that the accident happened without
any such negligence, lay upon the plaintiff." ...
"The proof of the first issue," continues the learned
Lord, "which is that of the defendant's negligence is
upon the plaintiff, the proof of the second, which is
that of contributory negligence, lies upon the defend-
ant s .
Section II. The Rule in England today.
Sub. 1. The latest authority.--Wakelin vs. The London
and Southwestern Railway Company (1887). The rule laid
down in the case justconsidered which places upon the defend-
ant the burden of showing contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, was fully and plainly approved in Wakelin
vs. The London and South Western R'y Co., 12 App. Cases, 41.
In that case the House of Lords laid down the latest statement
of the English law as to the question and the burden of proof
in cases of contributory negligence.
Sub. 2. The facts. At the trial before EManisty J.
and a special jury in Middlesex, it appeared that the defend-
ants' railway line crossed the public foot path on the level,
the approaches to the crossing being guarded by hand gates.
No night watchman was employed to take care of the gates and
crossing. The dead body of one Henry Wakelin, plaintiff's
husband was found on the line near the level crossing at
night, the man having been killed by a train which carried
the usual head-lights but did not whistle or otherwise give
warning of its approach. No evidence was giimn of the circum-
stances under which the deceased got on to the line.
The judge left the case to the jury who having found for
the plaintiff, the defendants carried the case before the
Divisional Court. The verdict was set aside and judgment
entered for the defendants.
Sub. 3. Second appeal. Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals (Brett M.R., Bowen S& Fry L.J.J.) affirmed this de-
cision. Brett, M.R. in his opinion took occasion to re-
state his views previously advanced in his address to the
House of Lords in Bridge's case I.R. 7 H. of L. 212 ; also
in his charge to the jury in Radley vs. London & North Western
R'y Co. 1 App. Cas. 755 ; and in Davey vs. London & Southwes-
tern R'y Co., 12 Q.B. Div. 70; that the plaintiff was not
only bound to give evidence of negligence on the part of the
defendants which was a cause of the death of the deceased,
but was also bound to give prima facie evidence that the de-
ceased was not guilty of negligence contributing to the acci-
dent ; and that by reason of the plaintiff having been unable
to give any evidence of the circumstances of the accident
she had failed in giving evidence of that necessary part of
her prima facie case. From this decision the plaintiff ap-
pealed.
Sub. 4. Third appeal-- The House of Lords. In the
House of Lords, however, upon the point raised in the Court
of Appeal as to the burden of proof in cases of contributory
negligence ,Brett, M.R. was overruled, and the correct view
was determined to be that the plaintiff was required to give
evidence only on the first head, that the accident was through
the negligent act of the defendants. Lord Watson in his
able and concise opinion maintained that no proposition in-
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consistent with the view here advanced, had been adopted
by the House in any previous case. In the course of
his remarks,the learned lord states that the onus of
proving affirmatively that there was contributory negli-
gence on the part of the person injured is, in the first
instance, upon the defendants, and that in the absence
of evidence tending to that conclusion,the plaintiff is
not bound to prove the negative in order to be entitled
to a verdict. If the plaintiff's evidence were suffi-
cient to show that the negligence of the defendants did
materially contribute to the injury, and threw no light
upon the question of the negligence of the injured party,
then, in the absence of any counter-ovidence from the
defendants, it ought to be presumed that there was no
such contributory negligence-- Even if the plaintiff's
evidence did disclose facts and circumstances bearing
upon that question, which were neither sufficient per se
to prove such contributory negligence, nor to cast the
onus of disproving it on the plaihtiff, the same opinion
would prevail.
Lord Blackburn concurred with Lord Watson.
Sub. 5. The same-- Lord FitzGerald's opinion.
Disagreeing with the rule laid down by the Master of the
14
Rolls in the Court of Appeals, "That the plaintiff in
such a case is bound to establish, first, negligence on
the part of the defendants, second, that such negligence
caused the injury of which plaintiff complains ; and
further if not involved in number two, that the plaintiff
is bound on his case to give affirmative evidence of the
negative proposition that he did not negatively contri-
bute to the accident." Lord FitzGerald says : "Before
the passing of Lord Campbell's act, in the common law
action for an injury alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the defendant, and when that most conven-
ient plea 'not guilty' was permitted, I always understood
that if the defendant relied as a defence on contributo-
ry negligence, though he was permitted to establish it
under 'not guilty', yet the issue lay on him and I am
not aware that any different rule has been established
since the passing of that statute,or since the practice
has been adopted of putting in special defenses, whether
the action was at common law for a personal injury or
under the statute, for a wrongful act causing the death."
The plaintiff does not in the statement of the
claim allege in terms the absence of contributory negli-
15
gence, and the defendant, if he relies on it, does so
affirmatively by special defense as in the case now be-
fore us. "The defendants further say that the death
of the said Henry Wakelin was caused by his own negli-
gence, and that he might and could by the exercise of
reasonable care and caution have seen the train approach-
ing and avoided the accident. It has been truly said
that the proof of negligence and contributor- negli-ence
are in such cases as that now before your Lordships so
interwoven as that contributory negligence, if any, is
generally brought out and established on the evidence
of the plaintiff's witnesses. . . . If the plaintiff
can establish his case in proof without disclosing any
matters amounting to contributory negligence or from
which it can be reasonably inferred--then the defend-
ant is left to give such evidence as he can to sustain
that issue."
Sub. 6. Bearing of the Wakelin case on the point.
The case was finally disposed of in favor of the defend-
ant, on the ground as Lord Halsbury L.C. in his opinion
states to be "It being incumbent upon the plaintiff to
establish by proof that her husband's death was caused
by some negligence of the defendant, to which the injury
complained of in this case is attributable. That is
the fact to be proved. And in the absence of direct
proof, the circumstances being such as are equally con-
sistent with the allegation of the plaintiff as with the
denial of the defendant, the plaintiff failed, for the
reason that the plaintiff is bound to establish the
affirmative of the proposition."
Accordingly the rule here adopted does not apply
to a case in which the proofs on the part of the plain-
tiff show,or tend to show, contributory negligence. If
such negligence conclusively appears, the court will
non-suit the plaintiff, or direct the jury to find for
the defendant. If the evidence only tends to show such
contributory negligence, the question must go to the jury
to be determined like any other question of fact, upon a
preponderance of evidence. But that cannot affect the
question upon whom the onus lies in the first instance.
CHAPTER III
AMERICAN JURISDICTIGNIS
FOLLOWING THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE
The rule is so undisputed that it is suffi-
cient for our purpose to cite one leading or recent de-
cision in point in the majority of the jurisdictions
considered.
Section I. Application of the doctrine in the state of
Alabama--
In the case of Birmingham Mineral Railroad Company
vs. Wilmer, 97 A.L.A. 165, decided in 1892, the defend-
ant in error, a brakeman in the employment of the Rail-
way Company was injured by being thrown from a freight
car by reason of the engine in the control of one of
the company's servants being suddenly started. Upon
a refusal by the court to charge as requested by the
defendant "that, under the evidence of this case, the
burden of proof of contributory negligence is not upon
the defenfant," the learned judge before whom the appeal
was tried held that the question had been ruled averse-
ly to demurrant in that contributory matter is a matter
18
of defense and in a complaint claiming damages for per-
sonal injuries received while in the service of the mas-
ter, it is not necessary to aver that the plaintiff was
in the exercise of due care at the time the injury was
inflicted. And he further said : "The burden of proof
as to contributory negligence is in all cases upon the
defendant. Plaintiff's evidence sometimes obviates the
necessity of proof by the defendant, that the injury was
due to contributory negligence, but even in such case
it is inaccurate and misleading to say that the burden
is on the plaintiff or is not on the defendant. A charge
to that effect is especially pernicious in a case like
this, where it was a matter of pure inference to be
drawn by the jury, whether plaintiff was negligent or
not, and where they found that he was not negligent as
they had a right to do. . . . The mere fact that there
is evidence which tends to prove the affirmative of an
issue, no matter from which side the evidence comes, does
not as a matter of law discharge the onus resting on the
party having the affirmative of that issue : the onus
is not discharged by any tendency of the evidence which
falls short of reasonably satisfying the jury of the facts
involved in the tendency. These charges were properly
19
refused". The above decision is upheld and supported
by that court in Mobile & Montgomery Railway Company
vs.Crenshaw, 65 Ala. 566 and cases cited ; Smoot vs. The
Mayor, etc. of Watumpka, 24 Ala. 112.
Section II. The Arizona case.
Southern Pacific Railway Company vs. Tomlinso, 33
Pac. Rep. 710, 1893. The plaintiff's intestate lived
on one side of the company's railroad track, and his
store was situated on the opposite side. Intestate was
struck by a train at a place used for a crossing by the
residents of the village. The refusal of the trial
court, at the close of the plaintiff's case, to direct
the jury to return a verdict for the defendant,at the
request of the defendant is assigned as error. Counsel
for appellant urge in their brief that the request s
should have been granted for the reason that plaintiff
fails to show due care and caution on part of the de-
ceased in attempting to cross the track at the time of
the accident. Sloan J. states the rule in this terri-
tory as declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Lo-
pez vs. Mining Company, I Ariz. 464, to be "that in ac-
tions for personal injuries, where contributory negli-
gence is relied upon as a defense, due care and caution
20
on the part of the plaintiff, in the absence of affirma-
tive proof to the contrary, will be presumed, arid the
burden of proving such contributory negligence rests
upon the defendant." Accordingly the trial court was
upheld as properly denying defendant's request that the
jury be directed to return a verdict for defendantand
judgment for defendant in error was affirmed.
Section IIi. The rule approved in Arkansas.
In behalf of Lhe defendant the court charged as
follows : "The mere fact of Lhe injury does not
render defendant liable. It must have been caused
by defendant's negligence, unmixed wiLh any fault on
plaintiff's part. And uhe plainuiff must prove neg-
ligence on the Part of Lhe defendant, and that she
was free from negligence on her part. And unless
you find from Lhe weight of the evidence, first,
that defendant was guilty of negligence which con-
tributed to her injury ; and, second, that she was
free from fault or negligence, you will find for the
defendant." Smith J. said Lnat the above prayer
announced an incorrect rule of law. Contributory
negligence is a defense and the proof of it devolves
upon the defendant who alle6es it, and therefore
holds the affirmative of this issue. The courts of
last resort in Massachusetts and several other states
have, indeed, adopted the contrary principle--Lhat
the plaintiff must show he was in the exercise of aue
care, at ulie time the injury happened. But this, it
is believed, is inconsistent with the rule of evidence,
adjusting the burden of proof according to 6he state
of the pleaaings ; and it is certainly opposed to Li~e
weight of authority as settled in England, in tie
supreme court of tie UniLea States and a majority of
the states of the union. This court has already
given in its adhesion to the more reasonable rule--
thaL the plaintiff will be presumed Lo have been or-
dinarily prudent until the contrary appears, either
from his own evidence or that Of Lne aefenuanL.
Texas & St. Louis Railway v. Orr ad. 46 Ark. 182.
The jury in that case, had Lhe instructions
been given it which were requested by the defernaant--
substantially, that as Lhe person had been injured
by a fall through an open trestle of the defendan''s
railway company, the law presumes that his own negli-
gence was the cause of his death, and before there
can be a recovery in Lhe action, it devolves upon
the plaintiff to show that said deceased was free
from fault--might well have concluded that the fact
that deceased was free from fault did not apLear by
a preponderance of evidence. The courM says :
"This insuruction was properly refused as it shifted
23
the burden of proving contribu.ory negligence on -ne
plaintiff, which, in this case, rested peculiarly
upon the defendant. If the plaintiff, in any case
of personal injury, can show negligence upon Liie part
of defendant, without, at the same time, disclosin)
the inherent weakness of iiis own cause by reason of
contributory negligence, then such contributory negli-
gence is a matter of aefense, in confession and avoia-
ance. affirmative in its character, and the burden is
upon the defendant to establish tne defense by a
preponderance of testimony, as in all oLher affirmative
defenses of like nature." Citation, L.R. & Ft's Ry. Co.
vs. Atkins, id. 423.
Section IV. The California Rule.
In the case of Mac Dougall,App. v. Central Railroaa
Co., Resp. 63 Cal. 431, the rule, as sta~ed in the
marginal note, "In an action Lo recover damages for
a personal injury alleged to have been received
through the negligence of the defendant, contributory
negligence on the part of tne plaintiff is a matter
of defense, and it is error to instruct the jury
that the burden of proof is on Lhe plaintiff to show
that the injury occurred without such negligence,"
is supported bY that court's decisions in the cases of
Robinson v. W.P. R.R. Co., 48 Cal. 476 Nehrbas v.
C.P. R.R. Co., 62 Cal. 320.
Section V. The Colorado Case.
In Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Ryan, decided
in 1891, the plaintiff's intestate was run over and
killed by a train of the railroad company's in the
city of Denver. The refusal of the trial court to
instruct the jury as requested by defendant, that the
burden of proof devolved upon the plaintiff to show
affirmatively that the killing of Ryan was caused by
the negligence of defendant, and also that the burden
of proof was upon the plaintiff to show affirmatively
that the accident which caused Ryan's death was not
the result of contributory negligence or want of
reasonable care and caution on his part ; and that if
plaintiff failed to thus prove either of said facts,
the jury must find for defendant, was assi,_ijed ai errvl
The court states that "where a defendant relies upon
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a
defense, such contributory negligence must be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence or the defense will
25
It
be unavailing. The judgment was affirmedciting Wall
v. Livesay. 6 Colo. 465. Lord. v. Pueblo S. & R. Co.
12 Colo. 393. K. P. Railway Co. v. Twombly, Adm'x
3 Colo. 129.
Section VI. The Rule in Dakota.
Sanders v. Reister. 1 Dakota 151.
The plaintiff in this case was injured while walk-
ing from her house to another's in the night time, by
falling into a cellar dug by the defendant upon his own
land. One of the requests made by defendant to the
court to charge the jury was in substance, that if the
jury believed that the plaintiff, going from her house
to Mrs. Roth's in the night time, and under circumstances
to which she has testified, did not exercise ordinary
care and thereby incurred the risks of the injury which
she complains to have suffered, then these plaintiffs
cannot recover and your verdict should be for the de-
fendant. The court refused to so charge and delivered
to the jury among other instructions, the following :
"Negligence on the part of the plaintiff is a mere
matter of defense to be proved affirmatively by the de-
fendants of which you must be satisfied by preponderance
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of the evidence, though it may, of course be inferred
upon the circumstances proved by the plaintiffs. The
law will not presume contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff."
The appellant excepted to this instruction and
claimed the court erred in so instructing the jury.
Bennet J. overruled this exception and further stated
that so far as the court is concerned, it is effectually
settled law as set forth in the case of Railway Company
v. Gladman, 15 Wal. 401, by Mr. Justice Hunt, that,
"The plaintiff may establish the negligence of the de-
fendant~his own injury in consequence thereof, and his
case is made out. If there are circumstances which
convict him of corcurring negligence, the defendant must
prove them, and thas defeat the action. Irrespective
of statute law on the subject, the burden of proof on
that point, does not rest upon the plaintiff."
Section VII. The Doctrine in the District of Columbia.
The case reported in 6 Mackey 39, of Tolson v.
Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co. was brought to recover
damages for crushing the foot of the defendant, at a
wharf on the Potomac river, in effecting a landing of
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a steamer in so negligent a manner that a portion of the
wharf was torn up and broken, and the foot of the plain-
tiff was caught and crushed among the broken timbers.
The plaintiff was the owner of the wharf, and was in the
habit of attending to his duties of a wharfinger.
"In rejecting the third prayer of the defendant the
court was clearly right," says Mr. Justice Merrick who
delivered the opinion of the court. "This prayer put
the burden of proof to establish affirmatively his case
and prudence. This is not the law in this jurisdiction
as is laid down by Muller v. D.C. 5 Mackey 289, McDade
v. Washington, etc. Railroad Company, 5 Mackey 144,"
and, he continued, "after the plaintiff has proved
negligence on the defendant's part he is entitled to rest
and the burden then falls on the defendant to prove want
of ordinary care and prudence in the plaintiff, if he
relies upon that as his defense."
Section VIII. The Latest Case in Kansas--The Rule
Stated.
In the early case Kansas Pacific Railway Company
v. Pointer, 14 Kansas 38 there is the following head note:
Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is
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matter of defense ; and if the record shows negligence
of the defendant, and is silent as to the conduct of the
plaintiff, a judgment for the plaintiff will be upheld."
Brewer J. delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon a brief review of the latest case on this
point, that of St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Com-
pany v. Weaver decided in 1886, it appears that the de-
fendant in error, a locomotive engineer in the employ-
ment of the plaintiff in error, a railway company, had
charge of an engine drawing one of its freight trains.
The injuries of the complainants were caused by the
engine running into a "wash-out" in Vernon Valley, and
over-turning, his arm being crushed between the driving
rods of the engine. It was claimed among other things
that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff to
show that he was not guilty of contributory negligence,
and not upon the defendant to show that he was. Valentine
J. giving the opinion of the court says : "The rule,
however, in this state is otherwise. (K.P.R'y Co. v.
Pointer, 14 Kan. 38, 50, K.C.L. & S. R'y Co. v. Philli-
bert, 25 id. 583 ;) The law presumes that every person
performs his duty, and this presumption continues until
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it is shown affirmatively that he does not and has not.
Hence while it may be said in a general sense
that the burden of proving his case devolves upon the
plaintiff, yet if he has shown that the defendant was
quilty of the negligence causing the injury complained
of, and the evidence tending to show that he has per-
formed his duty is at least equal to that which tends to
show otherwise, he has made out his case. This is
virtually throwing the burden of proof to show that the
plaintiff has been guilty of culpable contributory negli-
gence upon the defendant ; and this has been the uniform
holding of this court." (-IfI2l)
Section IX. The Rule in Kentucky.
In Paduca and Memphis Railway Company v. Hoehl, 12
Kent. 41 the head note states the rule as follows :
"The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to make out his
case--the onus is on the company to show that the plain-
tiff's own negligence contributed to the injury com-
plained of. When the plaintiff has shown the negligence
of the company, and the injury caused by it the cause
of action is made out, and unless his own proof shows
contributory negligence on his part he is entitled to a
recovery."
The action in the case of the Kentucky Central R.R.
Company v. Thomas's administrator, 79 Kent. 160 decided
in 1880, was an action brought by the personal represent-
ative of the deceased, Thomasto recover damages for the
loss of his life on the ground that the injury was caused
by the negligence of the agents and employees of the
railroad company, the plaintiff in error. The deceased,
a passenger, was at the time of the accident riding in
the express car when he should have been in the passen-
ger coach. Chief Justice Cofer delivering the opinion
of the court, said : "Contributory negligence is a de-
fense and avoids the plaintiff's case, and must be made
out by showing affirmatively not only that the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence, but that such negligence co-
operated with the negligence of the defendant to produce
the injury.
Section X. The Rule of the Maryland Case.
The county commissioners of Prince George's county
v. Burgess, 61 M'd 29, was a case in which the Appelles
horse was so injured by getting into a hole in one of the
bridges of the defendant county, and across which he was
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driving, that the horse died. The principle question
presented by the bill of exceptions arose upon refusal
of the court to grant the first prayer of the appellants
which was as follows : "That the plaintiff is not en-
titled to recover in this suit unless the accident com-
plained of happened while he ws exercising reasonable
prudence and care, and as he has offered no evidence on
this point their verdict must be for the defendants."
Irving J. says : "It is well settled in this state, that
the burden of showing contributory negligence on the part
of a plaintiff, is on the defendant. Bacon's case, 58
Md 484. This rule has been laid down in suits against
railroads for injury occasioned by them ; and we see no
reason for establishing a different rule as applied to
accidents occasioned by defective county roads and
bridges. The presumption that a man will act prudently
and with care for his own safety and will not recklessly
rush into destruction must exist as well in the one case
as in the other.'
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Section XI. The Minnesota decisions.
Hocum v. Weitherick, 22 Minn. 152, "Contributory net-
ligence is defensive matter, not required to be negatived
in the complaint, or disproved by the plaintiff, to
make out a prima facie case. The onus of proving it
rests upon the defendant. If, however, it appear from
the plaintiff's evidence, it will defeat a recovery."
Cornell J. upon this ground supported the lower court
in its refusal to charge as requested by defendant in
substance that it was required to appear, to the satis-
faction of the jury, that plaintiff was exercising due
care, that is to say, he must prove this as part of his
case, to enable him to recover, and also that the burden
of proof was upon the plaintiff to show affirmatively
that he was free from any contributory negligence on his
part.
Lorimer v. St. Paul City R'y Company, 48 Minn. 391,
laid down the further rule that a statute subjecting
railroad companies to liability to their servants for
the negligence of fellow servants, does not change the
rule as to the burden of proof of contributory negligence4
Section XII. The Doctrine in Missouri.
Thrope v. The Missouri Pacific R'y Company, 89 Mo.
650. This is a suit for damages for personal injury
sustained by the plaintiff, whilst in the employment of
the defendant as a switchman in its yards at Kansas City,
Mo. "Contributory negligence is a matter of defense
and need not be alleged or proved by the plaintiffs".
Fulks v. The St. Louis & San Francisco R'y Company,
111 Mo. 335. In this case the plaintiff brought suit
to recover damages for injuries which he received while
attempting as a passenger to get on a moving freight
train of the defendant's at a station. The court in-
structed the jury that the attempt of the plaintiff to
get upon a moving train was in itself negligence, and
that the burden is upon the plaintiff to relieve himself
of such imputation of negligence by showing that he
had permission or was directed to do so by the employees
of defendant in charge of the said train.', It appeared
upon the trial that the plaintiff was in the habit of
riding upon this train as a passenger. "These instruc-
tions", says Black J. "are faulty for the reason that
they placed the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to
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show that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Whatever the law may be elsewhere, it is well settled in
this state that contributory negligence is a matter of
defense. The burden is upon the defendant to plead
such a defense, and to sustain it when pleaded, by proof.'
Section XIII. The Recent Montana Case.With statement
of corollary to the rule.
In Nelson v. City of Helena (Mont.)39,Pac.Rep.905,
action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by reason of his fall-
ing upon one of the sidewalks of defendant) it being
alleged that the injury occasioned by reason of defend-
ant~s negligence in allowing ice to accumulate upon said
sidewalk. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment
entered in favor of defendant alleging error in the
court giving among other instructions, the following :
"The injury sustained by plaintiff is admitted, but be-
fore he can recover he must prove that it resulted from
negligence on the part of defendant, and without negli-
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ligence on his own part directly and immediately con-
Lributing to the accident." Upon this charge Dewitt
J. says : "It is a law of this jurisdiction that, in
actions for damages for personal injuries, contribu-
tory negligence is a mabter of uefence, and Lnat the
absence of contribuuory negligence is not required
to be proved by plaintiff, as part of his case.
Citing Higley vs. Gil'ier, 3 Mont. 97. there is a
corollary rather than an exception to this rule (Ken-
non vs. Gilmer, 4 Mont. 433.) the corollary being to
the effect that whenever the plaintiff's own case
raises a presumption of contributory negligence the
burden of proof is immediately upon him. In such a
case it devolves upon the plaintiff, as of course, to
clear himself of the suspicion of negligence that he
has himself created. He must make out his case in
full, and where the circumstances attending Lhe injury
were such as to raise a presumption against him, in
respect to the exercise of due care, the law requires
him to establish his freedom from contributory negli-
gence. Beach on contributory negligence, secLion
157. But this corollary is not applicable in the
case at bar.
Section XIV. The last holding in Nebraska.
Anderson admr. vs. Chicago B. & Q. or Co. 35 Nab. 95.
In this case complaint is made of the giving of
certain instructions, one of which, was that "the
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish
the fact that the deceased himself was not guilty
of carelessness or negligence, which caused or con-
tributed to the acciuent and death
The intestate ; a brakeman, while coupling the
cars of the defendant, was caught between certain
projecting timbers on a flat car and the box car,
and killed. It was claimed that this instruction mis-
stated the rule as to thie burdeb of proof upon the
question of contributory negligence. That instead of
the plaintiff being obliged to prove that the deceased
was free from fault, the burden rested upon the de-
fendant to establish that the intestate was guilty of
contributory negligence. The same point was consid-
ered by the court in the case of The City of Lincoln
vs. Walker, Neb. 244, where after a consideration
of conflicting authorities, it was ruled that "when
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the plainLiff makes out his case without showing neg-
ligence on nis part, contributory negligence is a mat-
ter of defence, and the buruen of establishing it is
on the defendant." The instruction under considera-
tion was accordingly held to be error.
Section XV. The decisions in New Hampshire. Smith vs.
the Eastern Railroad. 35 N.H.316.
The declaration of the plaintiff in this case,
alleging in substance that the plaintiff's horse, being
upon the tract of the defendant's road, was neglieently
and carelessly run over and killed by defendant's train,
was held to be sufficient by Fowler J. in his review of
the case, in as much as whatever defect there might have
been in omitting to state as to the maner in which the
horse came upon Lhe tract, was cured by -he verdict.
Since if the horse were there wrongfully or rightfully,
the defendants were responsible if they killed it, as
expressly charged and the court so found.
White vs The Concord Railroad, 30 N. H. 207 is a
similar case. Upon appeal the ruling of the court
was held to be correct ; namely that as the plaintiff's
animal was rightfully upon the crossing and was killed
by the defendant's train, the burden of proof was upon
the defendant, to show that it was done by no fault of
theirs, but by some accident , or by the fault of the
plaintiff.
Section XVI. The settled Doctrine of New Jersey.
In 24 N. J. 268, the case of Moore v. Railroad Co.,
there is given by Ogden J., a complete review of the
old English cases and the early cases of Massachusetts
which are the authorities generally cited to support
the rule that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove
himself free from contributory negligence ; and in con-
clusion the court sustains the objection of the de-
fendants that the verdict should have been for the de-
fendants. Potts J., however, limited the doctrine
which he conceived to be laid down in those cases and
says : "Where facts and circumstances appear either
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in the case made by the plaintiff, or that shown by the
defendant, upon which the question of plaintiff's negli-
gence comes up in the case, the onus is then thrown
upon the plaintiff to show ordinary care on his part.
Such facts and circumstances appear in this case."
In New Jersy Express Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. 434,
the court held that the plaintiff is not, as a condition
precedent to his right to maintain his action, bound
to prove affirmatively that the injijry was not contributed
to by his own negligence, under penalty of being non-
suited. The reasons assigned in the court below why
the non-suit should be granted were as appears by the
bill of exceptions, that the plaintiff was bound to
prove not only that the injury by him sustained was
caused substantially and proximately by the negligence
of the defendants, but also that the plaintiff was free
from negligence, and did not, by his own conduct, con-
tribute to the injury complained of ; and the plaintiff
in this case having failed to make proof accordingly,
that the said defendants were entitled to a non-suit.
The judge overruled this motion and was sustained by
Depue J., for the reason as he said, that "the law in
this state has been settled otherwise in this court,
in Durant v. Palmer, 5 Dutcher 544, and at the present
term in the case of Drake v. Mount."
Section XVII. The true rule in Oregon.
In Grant Admr. v. Baker et al. a case reported in
12 Oregon 329, the circuit court granted the defendant's
motion and the appellant was non-suited. The second
ground for the non-suit was "that the a.pellant had
failed to show the deceased was without fault at the time
of the action ; that the appellant was required to show
that the deceased was at the time of his death, free
from contributory negligence, before recovery could be
had. "
Upon appeal, Thayer J. in his opinion says : "The
circuit judge; allowing this motion, followed what he
supposed to have been held in Walsh v. Oregon Railway &
Navigation Co., 10 Oregon 250, where however, upon appeal
to this court a new trialwas ordered to be given and
the non-suit which had been granted upon substantially
the same motion, was set aside. The court further says:
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"I think it has always been understood by this court
that contributory negligence is a defense and must be
answered as such." The appellant in this case, ad-
ministrator for deceased who was killed by falling
from a street in the city of Astoria, offered evidence,
sufficient to authorize the inference that the deceased,
while lawfully traveling the street received his injury
in consequence of its being so filled up with timber and
lumber, and the rail being off the side, which had been
placed there as a protection to persons passing along
the sameas the street was built upon piles across some
tide land, and several feet above the surface. Accord-
ingly the new trial was granted, the judge overruling
the non-suit on the ground stated supra.
In the very recent case of Nord v. Umatilla County
App., 15 Oregon 313 decided in 1887 by Thayer J., the
head note states that : "The plaintiff must establish
that he was injured by the negligence of defendant by
testimony that does not tend to show contributory negli-
gence upon his part ; but beyond this, the burden of
proof to establish contributory negligence is upon the
defendant."
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The appellant's counsel asked the court to instruct
the jury that before any recovery could be had, the
pluintiff must have submitted to them a case clear of
contributory negligence on his part : that the injury
must have resulted exclusively from the negligence of
the defendant, before it could be called upon to res-
pond in damages therefor. "This proposition " says the
court, "would seem to imply that the plaintiff was re-
quired to establish that he was not guilty of negligence
in the affair which is not the rule. He was obliged to
show that the injury was received in consequence of the
defendant's negligence and would not then be entitled
to recover if his proof showed that he was also guilty
of negligence, which contributed to the injury. It
is immaterial whether a plaintiff in such a case is,
as a matter of fact, guilty of negligence or not, unless
the evidence upon one side or the other shows it. If
it does not al pear from the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff, then the defendant must establish it. It
primarily belongs to the defendant to prove it as a
defense, though he may avail himself of the benefit of
evidence tending to prove it, appearing from the plain-
tiff's own showing."
Section XVIII. The rule as stated in Rhode Island.
Cassidy Admr. v. Angell, 102 R.I. 447.
The plaintiff sues as administrator for deceased
who is found fatally injured in an excavation in a high-
way. All that was known of the matter was that on that
evening he had been seen walking along the highway in
his usual manner. The plaintiff alleges that having
large stones on the foot-path constituted the negligence
of the town's authorities which resulted in the deceased
death. The presiding justice non-suited the plaintiff
on this state of proof, and plaintiff excepted and
brought this petition for a new trial. Potter J.,
giving his opinionsays : "We think the case should
have been submitted to the jury. There is ordinarily
a certain degree of presumption that a person of ordi-
nary intelligence will not purposely expose himself to
danger ... If the plaintiff's own case shows that he
brought the injury on himself by his own carelessness,
he may be non-suited ; but if it does not he should not
be non-suited, but the question is for the jury ....
When the plaintiff shows negligence on the part of the
defendant, and there is nothing to imply that the plain-
tiff brought on the injury by his own negligence, then
the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence." Petition was
granted.
Section XIX. Statement of the South Carolina rule.
In the case of Crouch v. Charleston & Savannah R'y
Co., 21 S.C. 495, upon the trial before the lower court,
the defendant moved for a non-suit which w-as refused,
and now appeals to this court from the ruling of the
judge in refusing to sustain the demurrer and dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds of, first-- "Because the
complaint does not state that the plaintiffs were in the
exercise of ordinary care in passing defendant's bridge,
and second-- Because it does not state facts, from which
it might be inferred that the plaintiffs were in the
exercise of ordinary care in so passing the bridge."
Mr. Justice McGowan in delivering the opinion of the
court, says : "This court has held in the recent case
of Carter v. C. & G. R.R. Co., 19 S.C. 28, that con-
tributory negligence is a matter of defense and the bur-
den of proving it is with the defendant. We think it
follows from the onus of proof being on the defendant,
that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to make the
allegation.of due care in his complaint.
In the most recent case, that of Whaley V. Bartlett,
42 S.C. 454 decided in 1894, the defendants appeal
from the charge given by the court and move for new
trial on the ground, among othe r things, that his honor
erred in failing to charge as requested by the defendant,
that in order to recover anything "plaintiff must show
that even were there negligence on tiie part of the em-
ployees of the defendant that he used all reasonable
effort to avoid and fend off the results of this negli-
gence." Upon this consideration of the several excep-
tions to the judge's charge, Mr. Chief Justice McIver,
says : "The fifth exception alleges error in failing
to instruct the jury as requested in defendant's seventh
request. That request is based upon the erroneous as-
sumption that a plaintiff is bound to negative any con-
tributory negligence on his part. This is not only
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in conflict with the principles of logic, but, what is
more important, it is in conflict with several distinct
decisions of this court. A party is not required to
prove a negative, and as to this particular matter, it
is settled that contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense, and the burden of proof is upon the defendant."
It was so expressly held in Carter v. R.R. Co. and in
Crouch R'y Co., 21 S.C. 495. This exception must,
therefore, be overruled. '
Section XX. The latest case in South Dakota.
there
As recent as 1893his authority for the proposition
that "The burden of proving contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff rests upon the defendant, unless
the plaintiff in making out his case, prove, or give
evidence tending to prove, that he was guilty of such
contributory negligence ; and when there is no evidence
upon the subject it is the duty of the court to assume
that the plaintiff was not guilty of such contributory
negligence, and so instruct the jury." Smith v. Chicago
m. & St. P. R'y Co., 4 S.D. 71. This was an action to
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recover damages alleged to have been sustained by plain-
tiff through negligence of the defendant, in permitting
sparks to escape from its engine on the line of its rail-
way, whereby a quantity of hay belongin- to the plaintiff
was destroyed. It was contended by the counsel for the
appellant, that as the plaintiff alledged in his com-
plaint that he "was not guilty of any negligence which
in any way contributed to the loss of the hay," and
this allegation was denied by the general denial in the
answer, it was : therefore an issue in the case,and that
the court erred, not only in omitting to call the jury's
attention to this issue, but also in refusing to give
the instruction asked for by the defendant. Corson J.,
in his opinion,maintained that the allegation in plain-
ti'f's complaint, above set out was surplusage and its
denial raised no material issue that plaintiff was re-
quired to prove, and that such instruction to the jury
by the lower court was as fCavorable to the defendant
as the facts in the case would justify..
Section XXI. The true doctrine in Texas.
In the Dallas Wichita R'y Co. v. Spicker, 61 Texas
427 the marginal note says : "In an action for injuries
caused by an alleged failure of duty on the part of the
defendant, when the failure of duty and injuries are
shown by the plaintiff, and there is nothing that. implies
that he brought the injury on himself by his own negli-
gence, then the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove the plaintiff was guilty of such negligence. On
the other hand, when the plaintiff's own case exposes
him to suspicion of negligence, then he must clear off
such suspicion." "This" says the court, "we believe
to be the true rule." Wharton on negligence, 426.
There was no fact in proof in this case which tended to
show contributory negligence by the deceased. The de-
fendant, in his answer, alleged the defects in its
bridge from which resulted the injury to Spicker, were
known to him, and the court below instructed the jury
that the bu rden of proving such knowledge was on the
defendant. There was held to be no error in the judg-
ment for which it should be reversed, and the court
accordingly affirmed it.
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The marginal note in the case of The Texas & Il.O.
R'y Co. v. Crowder, 63 Texas 502 (1885)5 states that,
"The servant who seeks to recover for injuries claimed
to have been inflicted through negligence for which his
employer is liable must establish that negligence by
proof, and that he himself was not in fault but exercised
due care." Stayton Associate Justice citing Mayo v.
Boston & Me. Railroad, 104 Mass. 37
Section XXII.The Virginia rule.
Southwest Improvement Co. v. Andrew, 86 Va. 270.
In this case the court through Lacy J. says "The
second ground of exception to the declaration is, that
it does not allege a want of contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff. This is not necessary or
proper. In an action for damages occasioned by the
ne,-ligence or misconduct of the defendant it is riot
necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove the
existence of due care on his part to entitle him to re-
cover. If the defendant relies upon contributory
negligence of the plaintiff to defeat the action, he
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must prove it, unless indeed the fact is discovered by
the evidence of the plaintiff, or may be fairly inferred
from the circumstances."
As proof of due care is not a pait of the plaintifft
case it is of course, not necessary he should aver it
in his declaration. In the late case of the Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co. v. McKenzie a late case in this court,
reported in 81 Viginia 781, Lewis J., delivering the
unanimous opinion of this court, used the following em-
phatic language : "If the defendant relies on the
defense of contributory negligence it was incumbent .on
it to prove it, and in the absence of satisfactory proof
to establish such defense, the plaintiff must be pre-
sumed to have been without fault. This, indeed, is not
disputed."
Section XXIII. The Washington case.
Spurrier v. Front Street R'y Co. Appellant. 3
Wash. 659 (1892)t
The principal contention of the appellant in the
argument of the case upon appeal, was, that the court
erred in refusing to give the following instructions
asked by the defendant ; in part, that it is the law that
the plaintiff cannot recover in this case unless he has
established by a fair preponderance of evidence the two
propositions, "that there is negligence on the part of
the defendant~and the absence of contributory negligence
on his part." Upon this part of the instruction the
court says, Dunbar J. delivering the opinion, "This
instruction asked raised the question whether or not
contributory negligence is an affirmative offense. The
court instructed that it was, and that the burden of
proof was upon the defendant on this proposition . . .
we think the weight of authority, as well as the better
reasoning, sustains the view taken by the court below.
This has been the universal holding of the supreme
court of the United States." The plaintiff in this
action was injured by a collision of a cable car with
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her wagon, which she was unable to get off the track
because of the refusal of her horses to move and the
verdict in her favor was sustained.
Section XXIV. The rule in West Virginia.
The facts of the case rejorted in 18 W. Va. 579,
of Fowler v. B. & 0. R.R. Co. decided in 1881 were
beiefly as follows : the plaintiff was on the road to
Baltimore in charge of cattle on a stock train. On a
dark night while looking after the cattleman express
train while running at a very high speed struck and
injured the plaintiff who was on the track under assur-
ance from the conductor of the train that the stock
train was entitled to the main track and that it would
pull out shortly. It was insisted, by the plaintiff
in error, that the declaration ought to have alleged that
the plaintiff when injured was in the exercise of ordi-
nary care-- Johnson9announcing the opinion of the court,
says on this subject "This was wholla unnecessary,
because, if the plaintiff's want of ordinary care, or
his contributory negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury, it was purely a matter of defense and need
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not be alleged in the declaration, the burden of proof
of such negligence being on the defendant. Oiting
Snyder v. Pittsburg, Cinn & St. Louis R'y Co., 11 W. Va.
14; Sheff et ux v. City of Huntington, 16 W. Va. 307.
The demurrer to the declaration was properly overruled."
Section XXV. The recent Wisconsin case.
In Dugan v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
R.R. Co., 85 Wis. 609--decided in 1893-- the marginal
note says : "The statute providing that every railroad
company shall be liable for damages sustained by any
employee without contributory negligence on his part,
when such damage is caused by the negligence of other
employees specified does not change the rule as to the
burden of proving contributory negligence." In this
case error was assigned because the court refused to
charge the jurt to the effect that the burden was upon
the plaintiff of showing due care and freedom from
contributory negligence on his part. The jury found
that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the negligence
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of the defendant's engineer in charge of the locomotive
at the time, and consisted in moving his engine in
violation of the rule. Cassidy J. says, in delivering
the opinion of the court : "It is, in effect, conceded
that independent of this statute the burden of proving
contributory negligence, when not disclosed by the evi-
dence on the part of the plaintiff, was purely a matter
of defense. Hoye v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 67 Wis. 15 and
cases there cited. . .. The mere fact that the legisla-
ture embodies in the act in question the words, 'without
contributory negligence on his part', when the courts
would necessarily have supplied the same by construction
had they not been so embodied, cannot operate to change
the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff."
Section XXVI.-- The Federal Courts.
Sub. 1. The latest case upon this subject.
The latest case upon this subject in the Federal Courts
is that of Cohen vs. West Chicago Street Railway Co., 18 U.S.
App. 593, decided in 1894 in which case the action was
brought to recover damages sustained by reason of an injury
to the person of the plaintiff received while attempting
to board one of the defendant's cars in the city of Chicago.
One of the principal questions which the court was called to
pass upon was, whether or not there was error in the charge
(to which exception was taken) "that plaintiff might have
boarded either of the trailers behind the grip car, ..
and that he should have done so because they were nearer to
him, and this part of the charge proceeded upon the assump-
tion that the trailers attached to the grip car were open on
the side on which the plaintiff boarded the grip car."
Brunn, District Judge, says on this point ; "There could
have been no presumption of fact, such as the court's charge
proceeded upon, that the cars attached to the grip car were
open on the south side, so that they may have been boarded
from that side by the plaintiff. There was no proof upon
this point either way. This part of the charge bears upon
the question of the contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff, and the presumptions on this question were in his favor,
the burden being upon the defendant to prove such contribu-
tory negligence." For this and other reasons, the court
held the charge erroneous, and reversed the judgment, and
a new trial was granted.
Sub. 2. The rule in the Federal Courts stated in con-
nection with the Ohio decisions.
Horns adm'r. vs. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. 6 U.S.
App. 381, in marginal notestates that, "The rule in the Fed-
eral Courts is that the onus of showing contributory negli-
gence is on the defendant, and that defense may be founded
upon the facts shown by the plaintiff's evidence alone."
The court speaking through Swan, District Judge, reviews
the holding upon the statutes under which the recovery in thi
this case is sought to be obtained, as laid down in Penn. Co.
vs. Rathgeb, 32 Oh. St. 66 ; Baltimore & 0. Railroad Co.,
vs. Whitacre 35 Ohio St,, 627, 630 ; 28 Ohio St., 340 ; and
declares their ruling that "before the plaintiff can recov-
er because the signals were not given, he must cause it to
appear that this failure of duty brought about the disaster,
for if his own imprudence was the moving cause,he can not
maintain his action, although the company may not have ob-
served the provisions of the statute?" does in no way con-
flict with the rule of the Federal Courts, as stated supra.
Section XXVIII.-- The United States Supreme Court.
Sub. 1. The earliest rule in this court. The case of
Railroad Company vs. Gladmon.(1fO41)
As early as 1872, in case of Railroad Company vs. Glad-
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mon, where a small child of seven years was injured by a car,
this rule was adopted as the true and settled doctrine to be
followed. The defendant in that case upon refusal of the
court to charge, "that if the jury find from the evidence
that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from his attempt-
ing to cross a street in front of an approaching car, driv-
en by an agent of defendants, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to show affirmatively, not only the want of ordina-
ry care and caution on the part of the driver, but the ex-
ercise of due care and caution on his own part ... "
brought the case here on exception.
Mr. Justice Hunt, delivering the opinion of the court,
observesjthat as applied even to adult parties this propo-
sition is not correct. And further says "While it is true
that the absence of reasonable care and caution, on the part
of one seeking to recover for an injury so received, will
prevent a recovery, it is not correct to say that it is in-
cumbent upon him to prove such care and caution. The want
of such care or contributory negeigence, as it is termed, is
a defense to be proved by the other side."
After laying down the rule as quoted under the Federal
decisions, Hunt J. observes, "The plaintiff may establish
the negligence of the defendant, his own injury in conse-
quence thereof, and his case is made out. If there are cir-
cumstances which convict him of concurring negligence, the
defendant must prove them, and thus defeat the action.
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Irrespective of statute law on the subject, the burden of
proof on that point does not rest upon the plaintiff."
And as authority for this doctrine he cites the early
New York decisions treated of under thiat jurisdiction.
"Generally as liere," he continues, "the proof which
shows the defendant's negligence, shows also the
negligence or Lhe caution of the plaintiff. The ques-
tion of the burden of proof is, therefore, not usually
presented with prominence."
Although the later New York cases do not bear out
the learned judge's opinion, still that has in no way
effected the holding of this court as is shown by the
statements in the following cases which are illustra-
tive of various phases of the rule just stated.
Washington & Georgetown Railroad Company vs. Harnow,
147 U.S. Rep. 571. Grand Trunk Railway Co. vs. Ives,
144 U.S. Rep. 429 ; Hough vs. Railway Co., 100 U.S.
Rep. 213 ; Railway Company vs. Jones 95 U.S. Rep. 439.
CHAPTER IV.
AMIERICAN JURISDICTIONS
HOLDING THE CONTRARY DOCTRINES
Section I.--Applications of the rule in the decisions
of Indiana.
In Indiana as early as 1851, the court in the case
of the President etc. of Mt. Vernon vs. Dusouchett, de-
clared that merely because a person receives a special
damage by riding against a public nuisance in a street,
he can maintain a suit for the injury, even against the
person who put the nuisance there. The declaration
in a suit for such damage, must show that there was no
fault on the plaintiff's part. 2 Ind. Rep. 586.
In Maxfield vs. The Cincinnati, Indianapolis, & La-
fayette Railroad Company, 41 Ind. 269, the court laid
down the rule that a complaint seeking a recovery from
a railroad company on the ground of negligence in run-
ning a train of cars, whereby the plaintiff has been in-
jured, must expressly allege that the injury occurred
without the fault or negligence of the plaintiff, or it
must clearly appear from the facts which are alleged
that such must have been the case.
The question involved upon the appeal was the cor-
rectness of the ruling of the lower court in sustaining
a demurrer to the complaint which did not aver that
the plaintiff did not by his own fault or negligence
contribute to the injury by him received, and the facts
stated fell short of showing that the injury must have
occurred without the fault or negligence of plaintiff.
Buskirk J. accordingly held the complaint to be fatally
defective and affirmed the judgment for the reason stat-
ed supra.
"Contributory negligence is not a matter of de-
fense in this state, and the plaintiff must show affirm-
atively, by pleading and proof,that his fault or negli-
gence, did not contribute to his injury, before he is
entitled to recover"; quoted from the head note of case,
The Cincinnati, Hamilton & Indianapolis Railroad Company
vs. Butten,103 Ind. 31, decided in 1885. The opin-
ion of the court being given by Mitchell J.,who further
says "The verdict will be upheld if these facts are made
to affirmatively appear either directly or circumstan-
tially. It is only when the facts and circumstances
surrounding the injury point neither one way nor the
other, that the plaintiff must fail for want of affirma-
tive proof-- thus stating a corollary to the general
rule as laid down by this court supra. The latest
case, that of the Chicago & Indiana Coal Railway Company
vs. McDaniel, 134 Ind. 166, also follows the above hold-
ings.
Section II.-- The Iowa decisions.
In the case of Nelson vs. The C.R.I. & P.R.R.Co.,
38 Iowa, 564 , the plaintiff who was in the employ of
defendant was injured while in the discharge of his duty,
by being thrown from and under the car which ran over
him, the train having been suddenly started without sig-
nal. And the question again was, whether the court
erred in instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff,
"unless they further find from the evidence the plain-
tiff's own carelessness and negligence directly contrilaut
ed to produce the injury" The court says~that under
this ruling, the jury would be required to find for
plaintiff, if there was no evidence whatever respecting
the carelessness of the plaintiff ; whereas under the
rule long recognized, followed and settled, in this state
that in an action for injuries resulting from negligence,
there is no doubt but that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to show to the jury that the accident happened
without any want of reasonable care on his part. The plain-
tiff in order to recover, must show that he did not contribute
to the injury by his own fault, or by the want of ordinary
care." Citing Rusch vs. The City of Davenport, 6 Iowa 443,
and cases cited 452. But, as was said, in the case.first
above cited, "although the burden of proving the exercise of
ordinary care rests on the plaintiff, yet it need not be di-
rectly shown, and may be inferred from the circumstances of
the case."
In 1880 in case of Bonce vs. The Dubuque Street R'y Co.
68 Iowa 530, the Court again laid down the principle that the
burden rests upon one seeking to recover for injuties arising
from negligence of a carrier to aver and prove his own freedom
from contributory negligence. This rule is also laid down
in Raymond vs. The Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern R'y Co.
65 Iowa, 152, with a slight exception; the case was as followst
the plaintiff was injured by being thrown from the platform
of the defendant's car by reason of the sudden starting of the
train, while the plaintiff, as a passenger, was in the act
of leaving it at a station. The question was, whether it
was sufficient to shift the burden of proof for the plaintiff
to show his acts, if they failed to show contributory negli-
gence. The Court says : "Where there is no question of neg-
ligence by reaeon of an omission, and no question in regard
to the surrounding circumstances, and the only inquiry is as
to whether the injured person, in view of the conceded cir-
cumstances, was negligent in what he did, we are unable to
see how the plaintiff could do more than prove what he did.
In proving what he did, he would prove what care he exercised;
and acts fully disclosed and understood must always be deemed
sufficiently careful which evince no negligence."
The Court further held'kthatif the plaintiff showed
what his acts were, and they did not appear to be negligent,
the jury would be justified in finding that he was free from
negligence' while not correct as an abstract statement of the
rule, was not erroneous in this case, where it was clear that
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, unless
it was by reason of something which he did.
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Section III. The rule as finally settled and determined
in Louisiana.
In the early case of Moore v. The Mayor of Shreveport
3 La. Ann., 643, decided in the year 1848, the principlethat
the burden is upon the plaintiff to show freedom from negli-
genceis not decisively laid down, as the determination of
that question was not necessary to the decision of the case,
but Eustis, C.J. cited the case of Adams v. The inhabitants
of Carlisle, 21 Pick. 147, showing the tendency of the Lou-
isiana Court on this point.
Howeverin the case of Clements et ux vs. Louisiana
Electric Light Co., 44 La. Ann. 692, the marginal note lays
down the first recorded holding on this rule to be "When
the action of both parties zust have concurred to produce the
injury, it devolves upon the plaintiff to show that he was
not himself guilty of negligence. He must show affirmative-
ly that he was in the exercise of due and reasonable care
when the injury happened. 40 Ann. 787. This proof need
not be direct, but may be inferred from the circumstances of
the case.
In McGuire vs. the Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Rail-
road Co., (1894) 46 La. Ann. 1543, Miller J. says, deliver-
ing opinion of court, "In an action against a railroad com-
pany by the surviving parents for the loss of their son run
over and killed by the locomotive, the defense of contribu-
tory negligence will not avail if by reasonable care on the
part of those in charge of the train, the accident could
have been avoided." Quoting from Grand Trunk R.R. v. Ives,
144 U.S. Rep. 429, "Although the defendant's negligence may
have been the primary cause of the injury, yet an action for
such injury can not be maintained, if the proximate and im-
mediate cause can be traced to the ordinary care and caution
of the persons injured. Subject to this qualification
grown up in recent years, that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat recovery, if he shows
the defendant might, by the exercise of ordinary care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured par-
ty's negligence."
To this opinion and reversal of the judgment of the
lower court which had been in favor of the defendant railway
company, McEnery J. dissenting, says, The uniform doctrine
of this court has heretofore been that if the evidence shows
that the plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negli-
gence there can be no recovery, and that the plaintiff must
show that he was in the exercise of due care when the injury
happened. The proof need not be direct, but may be inferred
from the circumstances. "It is useless to cite authorities,
as every case in our reports where the fact of contributo-
ry negligence has been discussed this doctrine has been af-
firmed."
In the case of White et ux vs. Vicksburg, Shreveport &
Pacific Railroad 42 Ann. 992 in referring to this well estab-
lished doctrine the court said : "The defense is a general
denial and a plea of contributory negligence. It has
been ruled with such frequency and uniformity as to make
its iteration here merely formal, that, to sustain recovery
in such a case it must appear from the record : (1) that
the defendant was guilty of negligence ; (2) that the party
injured was guilty of no contributory negligence, i.e. negli-
gence but for which notwithstanding defendant's negligence,
the injury would have been avoided. "
"The Ives case quoted approvingly in the opinion, is
opposed to the views expressed in the opinion. In that case
the court emphatically announced the doctrine that if the
deceased contributed by his negligence to the injury, the
railroad was not responsible and the opinion of the court
is in line with the weight of authority and the few cases
referred to therein.
Section IV.-- The decisions in Maine.
The latest exposition of the rule in 1,'aine, is laid
down in the state of Maine vs. Maine Central Railroad Company,
76 Maine 357 by Walton J. : The question on which the case
was appealed waswhether the evidence justified the verdict
for the plaintiff-- the Court declared it as settled law
in that state that, in actions against railroad companies for
injuries to persons, whether in form civil or criminal, the
burden is upon the party prosecuting to show that the person
injured or killed, did not by his want of ordinary care con-
tribute to produce the accident. Upon the evidence the Court
held that a person in the full possession of his faculties,
who undertakes to cross a railroad track at the very moment
a train of cars is passing, or when a train is so near that
he is not only liable to be, but is in fact, struck by it,
is prima facie guilty of negligence ; and, in the absence of
a satisfactory excuse, his negligence must be regarded as
established.
The cases of Gleason vs. Bremen, 50 Me. 222; State vs.
Grand Trunk R'y Co., 58 Maine 176, are in point and favor
the above contention. In the case first cited it
was held that the law is clear and unquestioned that the
plaintiff must satisfy the jury, as an affirmative fact, to
be established by him, as a necessary part of his case, that
at the time of the accident, he was in the exercise of due
care. And in the second case cited it was held,
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after a full and careful examination of the question, that in
the trial of indictments against railroads to recover the
forfeiture created by our statute for negligently causing the
death of a person, "the same rule of evidence and the same
principles of law, should be applied, as in like cases when
redress is sought by civil action for damages."
Section V.-- A review of the Massachusetts holdings.
The first case in this country involving the question
of contributory negligence in this respect was Smith vs.
Smith, decided in 1824. In that case the Massachusetts
Courts adopted as settled law the doctrine therein set forth.
In that action, brought for an injury done to the plaintiff's
horse by a wood pile which the defendant had placed in the
highway, Parker C. J. upon deliberation, came to the conclu-
sion, "that the action could not be maintained, unless the
plaintiff can show that he used ordinary care ; for without
that, it is by no means certain that he himself was not the
cause of his own injury:" The case from which the judge
devolved the law, was Butterfield vs. Forester, llEast 60,
which he thought very strong to the point. In that case it
was proved, that if the plaintiff had not been riding very
hard he might have seen the obstruction and avoided it, and m
this ground he failed in the action. Quoting Lord Ellenbor-
ough "A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction
which has been made by the fault of another, and avail him-
self of it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary cau-
tion to be in the right". And in the Common Pleaq in the
case of Flower vs. Adam, 2 Taunt. 314, the same principle is
recognized as law, the plaintiff being prevented from recover-
ing, because it was proved he might have avoided the obstrue-
tion, if he had managed his horse with ordinary skill and
care. These cases are cited in Wheaton's edition of Sel-
wyn's Nisi Prius, and the principle is admitted into the text,
that to entitle the plaintiff to an action for damages re-
sulting from a nuisance, he must show that he acted with
cormon and ordinary caution.
In 1831,Lane vs. Crombie, 12 Pick. 176, where the plain-
tiff was injured by defendant's driving on the highway, the
cause was tried before Putnam J.and a verdict was found in
favor of the plaintiff. Upon a motion to set aside the ver-
dict on the ground of misdirection in that the Court in
the course of the charge, stated that the burden of proof was
upon the plaintiff to prove negligence in the defendants,
that being the gist of the case, but that when the defendants
relied upon the fact, that the plaintiff conducted herself
carelessly, the burden of proof was upon the defendants to
show that the plaintiff had not used ordinary care, the rule
was laid down as settled law that to enable the plaintiff to
recover under such circumstances, he must not only show some
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negligence or misconduct on the part of the defendant, but
ordinary care and diligence on his own part, citing Butter-
field vs. Forester ; Harlow vs. Hurnmiston, 6 Cowen 191 ;
Smith vs. Smith, 2 Pick. 64: and the Court further said that
the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the accident
was not occasioned by her own negligence, in placing her-
self in a hazardous position, without due precaution and for
that reason the verdict was set aside and new trial granted.
The case of Adams vs. Carlisle, 21 Pick. 146 is a similar hold-
ing, and, was decided upon the same grounds by Shaw C. J.
Shaughnessey vs. Sewall and Day Cordage Company, 160
Mass. 331,(1893). Upon a declaration alleging in substance,
that while the plaintiff was in the process of oiling a ma-
chine while in the defendant's employ, it suddenly and unex-
pectedly started into motion ; occasioning injury to the
plaintiff ; that when shut off for the purpose of oiling,it
was likely to start ; that the defendant knew or ought to have
known that it was likely to start ; and that the defendant
omitted to caution the plaintiff as to its liability to start;
the case was tried upon the theory, on the plaintiff's part,
that the machine started of itself ; and, on the defendant's
part, that it was started by a fellow servant of the plain-
tiff. Plodgett, J.,of the Superior Courtcharged the jury
that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the machine
started of itself ; that he could not recover unless he proved
this ; and that, if the jury were unable to decide what caused
the machine to start, she was not entitled to recover.
Allen J. upon appeal~opinioned that the charge to the jury
was correct and plaintiff's alleged exceptions were overruled.
The true rule of this jurisdiction and one of general applica-
tion, appears to us to be that stated in the case of M'ayo vs.
Boston & W. Rly Co., 104 Mass. 140. It is stated in these
words : " All the circumstances under which the injury was re-
ceived being proved, if they show nothing in the conduct of
the plaintiff, either of acts or neglect, to which the iyijury
may be attributed in whole or in part, the inference of due
care may be drawn from the absence of all appearance of fault7
Section VI.-- Exposition of the rule as set forth in the
.ichigan decisions.
In the first case in which this point was involved, the
Court said, "the facts which the plaintiff sought to estab-
lishwere that he was injured, and that the negligence of the
defendants was the approximate cause. Necessarily intermingl-
ed with this, however, was the question whether the plaintiff
had not also been guilty of negligence which materially con-
tributed to the injury ; and this question was so involved
in the examination of plaintiff's witnesses, that it was im-
possible to keep it out of view for a moment ... ..... And
the plaintiff found it necessary in this case to put in evi-
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dence such facts concerning the management of the train by
the defendants as would tend to relieve him from this appar-
ent liability to censure. In the marginal note the follow-
ing is accordingly stated : where the plaintiff brings ac-
tion for a negligent injury, and the action of the two par-
ties must have concurred to produce it,it devolves upon him
to show that he was not himself guilty of negligence. Detroit
& '"ilwaukee R.R.Co. vs. Vtn Steinburg,ll iLich. 99,(1868),
Quoting Ch. J. Christiancyin case of Lake Shore &
Michigan Southern Railroad Co. vs. Miller, 25 Vich. 275, it
appears to be settled "that an injury resulting from the neg-
ligence of both,though in an unequal degree, gives no cause
of' action to either, and the abstract fact of the collision
alone, would turn the scale in favor of neither, neither
makes out a cause of actio till he shows that he exercised
due care, and that the other party did not. The absence of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is there-
fore just as essential an element in the cause of action as
the negligence of the defendants, and just as clearly consti-
tutes a necessary part of the plaintiff's case ; and until he
has shown it, or until it in some way appears from the evi-
dence, he does not make a prima facie case": citing 17 Mich.
99; 17 Ind. 102.
In one of the -iost recent cases, that of Mitchell vs.
Chicago & Grand Trunk R'y Co. 51 Iich. 236, there is stated
in the head note the following holding : "Negligence of a
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railwa.- company will not be presumed in an action against it
for a personal injury, it must be shown, and there can be no
recovery unless it appears to be the efficient cause of the
injury without contributory fault in the plaintiff."
Section VII.-- The Uississippi cases.
The Courtlin the case of i"iss. Central R.R.Co. vs. T7ason,
states the general rule with regar. to concurrent negligence
to be "that the party seeking legal redress must not only
show his adversary to be in the wrong, but must also be pre-
pared to prove that no negligence of his own has tended to
increase or consummate the injury." And then the further
requirements that the party in an action on the case for
negligence, must show himself in the right and the defendant
in the wrong ; that he has performed his duties and that the
defendant has neglected his, and that the damages are the
legitimate consequence of the negligence of the defendant.
51 ],Piss. 224.
In the city of Vicksburg vs. Hennessy, 54 Miss. 391,
where the defendant in error had been injured by a fall while
walking upon the streets of a city, the courL says : "The
universal rule in this class of cases is that the injury
must proceed wholly and solelyfrom the defective highway, and
that the plaintiff must be entirely free from any negligence
which contributed to the result, and that the burden of show-
ing affirmatively that he exercised at least ordinary c:re
and prudence is upon him. Unless he establishes this he must
fail, notwithstanding he has shown the greatest remissness
on the part of the corporate authorities-- and cites Lane vs.
Crombie, 12 Pick 177, Mloore vs. Abbot, 32 Me. 46.
Section VIII.-- The rule as modified in North Carolina.
The intestate of plaintiff~in the case of Owens vs. Rich-
mond and Danville R.R.Co., 8F, N.C. 502(18S3), who was an en-
gineer in the employment of defendant company, and as such in
charge of the fast mail train then moving rapidly southward
from Thomasville, its last stopping place, a little after the
hour of 11 p.m., brought the train in sudden and violent
contact with an unobserved obstruction consisting of stone and
dirt~whichbecoming loosened from the upper portion of a deep
cut through which the railroad ran, was piled upon the track--
both intestate and fireman were instantly killed from the
shock. The question was simply as to the character or quali-
ty of the intestate's own act, as determined by the attending
circumstances : the Court among other instructions charged
the jury : "If the jury believe that the defendant was guil-
ty of negligence, then it devolves upon the defendant to sati&-
fy the jury by a preponderance of evidence that the plain-
tiff's intestate was killed by his own negligence, or that
he contributed to his death." Smith J. speaking for the court
says : "It was not proper to burden the defense with the re-
moval of the presumption thus raised for the plaintiff, and
put it in the scale with the evidence on one side of the propo-
sition to outweigh that adduced on the other. The inquiry
should have been free from that erbarrassment, and simply
left to the jury to solve upon the evidence heard. As
this was not done in the present case, but an inappropriate
rule applied, to the prejudice of the defendant" the Court
goes on to say, "it is entitled to a trial before another
jury". Up to this time, 1883, it had been an open question,
and to the decision given supraRuffin J. dissented.
However in 1893, in the case of Jordan vs. Ashville,
112 N.C. 743, MacRae J. giving the opinion of the Court cor-
rects His HonorBynum J. who had upon the trial before the
Superior Court, stated the proposition that "the plaintiff
claims that she has been injured by the negligence of the de-
fendant, and the burden is on her to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that fact, and the following fact, that she her-
self was not guilty of negligence," by saying that under
the statute which requires that, in actions for the recovery
of damages resulting from the negligence of the defendant,
contributory negligence, if relied upon as a defense, shall be
set up in the answer and proved on the trial, there is no pre-
siuption that the plaintiff contributed to the injury by her
own negligence. By placing the burden upon her tne condi-
tions were changed. Therefore it was error in the judge to
so charge, though the defendant offered no testimony.
CHAPTER V.
AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS
IN WHICH THE DOCTRTNE IS UNCERTAIN
Section I.-- The rule in Connecticut.
In this state there is to be observed a tendency to
incertitude upon this question, but we will here :Lerely out-
line the leading cases in point, treating of the same trend
of adjudications later on in the New York decisions.
The case of Fox vs. The Town of Glastenbury, 29 Conn.
204, was one in which an action was brought on the statute
with regard to highways and bridges, to recover darages for
the loss of life by reason of negligence of defendants in not
maintaining a railing along the sides of a causeway, which
was a part of a public highway of the town. There was a
freshet in the river and the water covered the causeway, flow-
ing with a strong current; the plaintiff with another woman
attempted to drive over the causeway laid across a cove. Af-
ter passing over the bridge, becoming alarmed, they drove off
the causeway and the plaintiff's testatrix was drowned.
Upon appeal from a verdict fur the plaintiff, the court
applied what it termed the well settled rule of law, as laid
down by 1,r. Justice Gridley in Spencer vs. Utica and Schenect-
ady R.R.Co., 5 Barb. 337, that a party who would recover for
an injury caused by the negligence of another, must show that
his own negligence has not contributed to cause the injury--
which rule the learned judge, declared to be "a stern unbend-
ing rule which had been settled by a long series of adjudged
cases",, and this rule must be considered as the settled law
of the state. In order to entitle the plaintiff to a ver-
dict, he was bound to show, affirmatively, not only the culpa-
ble negligence of the town, but also that the decedent con-
ducted herself with ordinary prudence and discretion. Citing
Beers vs. Housatonic R.R.Co., 19 Conn.566, Park vs. O'Brien,
23 id. 339.
In the case of Park vs. O'Brien, 23 Conn. 339, the first
error assigned for appeal is, that the lower court omitted to
charge the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff
below, of proving that when the injury complained of was co-
mitted, he was in the exercise of reasonable care and pru-
dence. Storrs J. in his opinion accords entirely with the de-
cisions cited by plaintiff in error to substantiate his ex~cep-
tion and further says, the reason of the rule is, that the
,laintiff must prove all the facts -.hich are necessary to
entitle him to recover, and this is one of those facts. It
was necessary for the plaintiff to prove, first, negligence
on the part of the defendant, in respect to the collision al-
leged, and, secondly, that the injury to the plaintiff occur-
red in consequence of that negligence. But in order to
prove this latter part, the plaintiff must show that such in-
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jury was not caused, in whole or in part, by 12!s own negli-
gence; for, although the defendant was guilty of negligence,
if the plaintiff's negligence contributed essentially to the
injury it is obvious that it did not occur by reason of the
defendant's negligence. Hence to say that the plaintiff must
show a want of concurring negligence on his own part, con-
tributing to the injury, is only saying that he must show that
the injury was owing to the negli.ence of the defendant. In
this case he plaintiff assumed the burden of proving that
fact ; and the defendant also had the benefit in the charge,
in t'he rule, which he requested the court to express to the
jury, although not in the precise words in ..--hich he sets it
forth supra. The other grounds assigned for error being dis-
posed of, a new trial was not granted.
SectionII .-- The doctrine in Georgia.-- Development of the
rule.
In Brannan vs. May, 17 Ge. 136, the Court laid down
the rule as stated in Butterfield vs. Forester that, "To
maintain an action for an injury received from an obstruction
in a highway, two things must concur : an obstruction in the
road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it, on the part of the plaintiff".- and so far
seems to have imposed the burden upon the plaintiff to show
his exercise of care-- but no further ground for such an inti-
mation of the rule is present.
In Campbell vs. Atlanta & Richmond Air Line Railroad
Company, 53 Georgia, 48Q, the marginal note is as follows :
"In the case of an injury to an employee of a railroad company
caused by the running of a train , whilst the burden is on the
company to prove that it used proper care and diligence, it
is necessary for the plaintiff to show that the injury was
caused without fault or negligence on his part."
In Thompson vs. Central Railroad & Banking Company, 54
Ga. 509, the marginal note states that the fact that the em-
ployee was without fault or negligence is not a condition
precedent to his recovery ; in his case, as in others, the
presumption is against the company, and it is for it to show
its agents without fault or negligence and the injured em-
ployee either at fault or negligent.
Prather vs. The Richnmond & Danville R.R.Co., 80 Ga.427
(188). The plaintiff's husband, one of a gang employed on
defendant's material train, to load and unload the cars, was
thrown off and killed by the car striking a cow crossing the
track. An engine of defendant was at the time pushing the
car. Execption was taken (and rade one of the grounds for
new trial) because the Court charged the jury that "the
burden is on the plaintiff to show that her husband was with-
out fault, or that the defendant was in fault." The Court
remarks that upon this matter the rule has been so long set-
tled by this Court, that we do not think it necessary to de-
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vote any time to show the correctness of it-- Further charg-
ing that "the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that he
did not thus contribute ; and if she has failed to do this,
it will be your duty to return a verdict fcr the rlefendant."
"We see no error in this charge taken in connection with the
entire charge upon the same subject. It is certainly a sound
proposition, under the decisions of this court, that
before an employee can recover from a railroad company, he
must be free from fault. . . . If he disobeys these rules or
orders (as it appeared from the evidence that he had so done)
the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the disobedience
did iict contribute to the injury."
The marginal note in the latest case, that of City Coun-
sel vs. Hudson, R8 Ga. 599, decided in 1891, states the
latest exposition of the rule to be,that when the plaintiff,
in an action against the owner of a toll bridge proves his
injury arid the owner's negligence as alleged, he is not bound
to go further and prove his own diligence. Want of care on
his part is matter of defense.
Section III.-- The modification of the rule in Illinois.
Missouri Furnace Company vs. Abend,107 Ill.44. In this
case an engineer who was in the employ of the defendant fell
from the locomotive, was run over and killed. The deceased
had complained to the defendant of the defective condition
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Of the engine, and was told the defects would be speedily re-
paired. The principal question is whether, the deceased was,
himself, guilty of such negligence by remaining in defendant's
service after he knew the foot board of t1e engine was in a
dangerous condition, as will bar a recovery. This question
being decided in the negative, the Court further held that
the law does not always require positive proof of due care
and diligence on the part of the plaintiff. Under certain
circumstances it may be taken for granted that he observed
usual and ordinary care for his personal safety". The criti-
cis'i made upon this charge that it assumesdeccased was in the
exercise of due care and diligence is not well founded, for
there were circumstances tending to show deceased observed
ordinary care and that was sufficient to warrant giving of
the instruction.
Kepperly vs.Ramsden, 83 Rll.354. Plaintiff in this case
was injured by falling into an excavation in the aide walk
made with a view to construct coal vaults for the use of the
adjoining building. This Court upon appeal laid down the
settled principle that before any recovery can be had, it is
incudbent on plaintiff to show she had herself been in the
observance of due care for her personal safety. That being
the law Mr. Justice Scott said that the lower Court ought to
have given the instruction asked by defendant, which declares
the burden of proving that fact upon her. Other instructions
given state the proposition that she was bound to observe due
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or ordinary care, but none of them declare as the law is, the
burder of proving that fact is on the plaintiff. Chicago,
Burlin gton & Quincey R.R.Co. vs. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272. The
judgment was accordingly reversed,and the cause remanded.
The first case bearing upon this point is The Aurora
Branch R.R.Co. vs. GriMes, 13 Ill. Rep.585, decided in 1852
by this Court. At the hearing in the lower Court, Grimes re-
covered damages for the value of his horse which was killed
in a well belonging to the railroad company. Upon appeal
the Court said that where the party ceased to recover damages
for a loss which has been caused by negligence or misconduct,
he must be able to show that his own negligence has not con-
curred with that of the other party introducing the injury,
and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show not only
negligence on the part of the defendant, but also that he
exercised proper care and circurispection ; or, in other words,
that he was not guilty of negligence. Citing Lane vs.Crombie
12 Pick. 177.
This holding was followed in Dyer vs. Talcott, 16 Ill.
300, and the latest decision in this jurisdiction has more-
over, laid down the rule, that before a plaintiff can recover
on ground of mere negligence, he "must show that the negli-
gence of which he complains *as caused by the negligence of
the defendant, and that he himself wVas in the exercise of
ordinary care"--- per Bailey J. in North Chicago Street R'y Co
vs. Eldridge, 151 Ill. 542.
Section IV.-- The conflict of decisions in New York.
Sub. 1. The early cases--- Spencer vs. Utica & Sche-
nectady R.R.Co.
In the earliest reported cases in the jurisdiction of
New York there appeared no holding bearing directly upon the
question of burden of proof with which we are here dealing.
The first intimation of any rule upon the subject is given
in the case of Spencer vs. Utica & Sbhenectady R.R.Co.,report-
ed in 5 of Barbour, 337. It appears in this old case decid-
cd in the year 1849, Ridley J. delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court, that the undisputed facts alone made it im-
possible to maintain that the plaintiff was free from negli-
gence, and the Court based particularly its decision upon
Hartfield vs.Roper, 21 Wend. 615, a case where this question
of onus probandi was not at all involved nor adjudicated.
So much then was necessary for the decision of the case. But
the Court further said : "It was equally necessary for the
plaintiff to establish the proposition that he himself was
without negligence and without fault. This is a stern and
unbending rule, which has been settled by a long series of
adjudged cases, which we cannot overrule if we would."(Citing
1 Cowen's Report 71 ; 6 Hill 592 ; 19 Wend. 399 ; 6 Cowen 189;
5 Hill 282.) The cases given as authority for this settled
law, as the learned judge terms it, do not in my opinion
very strongly sustain his honor in such a doctrine ; in fact,
not one of them bears directly upon the point involvedbut are
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decided on a rather indefinite rule fashioned after the word-
ing in Butterfield vs. Forester. So much for one of the
principal authorities relied upon as upholding the later de-
cisions of these courts as to this question.
Sub. 2. The earliest rule.
In this jurisdiction we shall look in vain in the re-
ports for any earlier adjudication upon the point in dis-
cussion than is to be found in the case of Johnson vs. Hudson
River R.R.Co., 5 Duer. 21. This case was decided in 1855
by the Superior Court, Judge Duer giving the opinion. His
statement contains the clearest and ablest presentation of
the law in this behalf, and the fairest and most satisfactory
argument upon it to be found in any-of our American decisions
upon the subject. In arriving at this opinion the Court en-
tered into a very full discussion of the general rule.
The question to be decided in that case waswhether the
complaint ought to have been dismissed,as it was, for the
reason that was alleged, namely, that the plaintiff had failed
to prove that the deceased was free from negligence, which
was imputed to him by the answer of the defendants. In other
words, had failed to prove a negative. The Court says : "It
is certainly true, as a general rule, that there can be no
recovery in these actions, when it is proved that there vas a
want of ordinary care, on the part of the person accidental-
ly injured, which directly contributed to the accident ; but
it by no means follows, that the plaintiff is, in the first
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instance, bound to show that the person so injured could not
have been guilty of the negligence imputed." The rule
therein adopted is clear and concise. It states that the
burden of proving that there was a want of ordinary care
on the part of the person injured, which contributed direct-
ly to the accident, rests upon the defendant. The plaintiff,
in order to maintain the action, is not bound to prove a neg-
ative by showing affirmatively that there was no such want
of ordinary care. The judgment dismissing the complaint
was accordingly held erroneous, and was reversed.
Upon the trial before the General Term, Slosson J. sit-
ting as the Court, the decision of the trial court was up-
held ; the court declaring that it had never recognized the
rule which seems to be laid down by the Supreme Court in
Spencer v. Utica, Schenectady Railroad Company, where it
was held that the absence of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is to be shown by him affirmatively, but on the
contrary have held otherwise.
Sub. 3. The supposed exception to this Rule.
Following this early authority is a great array of ad-
judications. At a term held in the year 1858, the great
case of Button v. Hudson River Railroad Company, 18 N.Y.,
248, was decided in the court of appeals, being the first
intimation of that court's tendency toward an exception to
this doctrine as stated in the preceding case. The intes-
tate had been run over and killed by a horse car of the de-
fendant moving along West Street, in the City of New York,
at the hour of eleven in the evening. The opinion of
Mr. Justice Strong contains in substance, whatever arguments
were used in the succeeding years by the New York courts
in favor of the rule as thereafter laid down, and they amount
it is submitted, to this : that-- "In regard to all the cir-
cumstances essential to the cause of action, the plaintiff
held and was required to sustain the affirmative. Among
those circumstances were, that the defendants were negligent,
and that the injury resulted from that negligence. If the
intestate was negligent, and his negligence concurred with
that of the defendants in producing the injury, the plain-
tiff had no cause of action. . . . In this view the
exercise of due care by the intestate was an element of
the cause of action, without proof of it, it would not
appear that the negligence of the defendants caused the in-
jury." The cases cited by the learned judge in support
of his position, which, he says "lead to the same conclu-
sion", do not in my opinion, very clearly declare such a
doctrine. No one of them is any clearer citation to this
point than is the first case above mentioned, that of Butter-
field v. Forrester, from which the rule is a mere inference.
The court, however, qualifies the former statement of the
doctrine,by observing that "It must not be understood that it
was incumbent on the plaintiff in the first instance, to
give evidence for the direct and special object of
establishing the observance of due care by the intestate ;
it would be enough if the proof introduced of the negligence
of the defendants and the circumstances of the case , prima
facie, established that the injury was occasioned by the neg-
ligence of the defendants ; as such evidence would exclude
the idea of a want of due care by the intestate aiding to
the result. Ordinarily in similar actions, when there has
been no fault on the part of the plaintiff, it will suffi-
ciently appear in showing the faults of the defendant, and
that it was a cause of the injury ; and when it does so, no
further evidence on the subject is necessary. The fact
must appear in some way, but in what particular mode is un-
important. The evidence of it may be direct and positive or
only circumstantial. Whatever the nature of the evidence,
if there is any conflict as to the fact, there must be a pre-
ponderance of proof in support of it, or the action must fail".
Sub. 4. The opinion in the Johnson case upon trial
in the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the lower court is affirmed, but the
open stand there assumed is so modified that exceptions and
refinements upon the doctrine followed in a copious flood,
so that all the modern law as to the burden of proof may,
without the least extravagance, be said to have had its ori-
gin in the effect of this case upon subsequent jurisprudence.
No other reported case, either in this country or in England
has had so great an influence in changing the current of the
decisions more radically, to the final establishment of an
exception to the former doctrine. Judge Denio, in his ad-
mirable opinion says : "The culpability of the defendant
must be affirmatively proved before the case can go to the
jury, but the absence of any fault on the part of the plain-
tiff may be inferred from the circumstances, and the dispo-
sition of men to take care of themselves and keep out of
difficulty, may be properly taken into consideration ....
The true rule, in my opinion," continues the judge, by way
of summing up, "is this : The jury must eventually be sat-
isfied that the plaintiff did not, by any negligence of his
own, contribute to the injury. The evidence to establish
this may consist in that offered to show the nature or
cause of the accident, or in any other competent proof. To
carry the case to the jury, the evidence must be such as,
if believed, would authorize them to find that the injury
was occasioned solely by the negligence of the defendant.
It is not absolutely essential that the plaintiff should
give any affirmative proof touching his own conduct on the
occasion of the accident. The character of the defendants
delinquency may be such as to prove prima facie the whole
issue ; or the case may be such as to make it necessary for
the plaintiff to show by independent evidence that he did not
bring the misfortune upon himself. No more certain rule
can be laid down."
Sub. 5. Illustrative holdings.
In Wilds vs. Hudson River Railroad Company, 24 N.Y.,
430, the court, as authority for the holding that the great-
est negligence on the part of the defendant will not cure
the defect of the least negligence contributing to the inju-
ry on the plaintiff's part, cites Johnson vs. H.R.R.R. Co.,
20 N. Y., 73, which it declares states the full extent of
this position as held by this court to be that "to carry a
case to the jury, the evidence on the part of the plaintiff
must be such as, if believed, would authorize them to find
that the injury was occasioned solely by the negligence of
the defendant.'
In the case of Ernst vs. Hudson River Railroad Company
24 Howard's Practice, 97 (1862), we find that the court for
the first time was fully and plainly committed to the rule
that requires the onus to rest on the plaintiff. The opin-
ion of the court there isthat-- "A party suing for negligene
must come into court faultless; he must not present a mere
balanced case. The burden of proof is upon him and he must
satisfy the court, by the greater weight of testimony, that,
without any careless ness of blame on his part, he has suf-
fered injury."
In 1873 this court took an opposite ground, declaring
that, "the concurring negligence of the plaintiff is matter
of defense, and the plaintiff is under no obligation to prove
anything to entitle him to recover but the injury, and that
Iit was caused by defendant's negligence. Hackford vs.
N. Y. &c. R. Co., 6 Lans. 381- also Robinson vs. N.Y. &c.
R. Co., 65 Barb.. 146
However, the former doctrine, as approved and upheld in
Warren vs. N.Y.C. R.R. Co., 44 N.Y., 471 ; Reynolds vs. N.Y.
C. & H.R.R. Co., 58 N.Y., 248 ; Cordell vs. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.
Co., 75 N.Y., 330, was again firmly established in Hale Vs.
Smith 78 N.Y., 488, where it is said by Rapallo J., "that
the absence of contributory negligence is part of the plain-
tiff's case, and the burden of satisfying the jury upon that
point rests upon him. To the same effect is the opinion of
the court, Miller J., in the case of Hart vs. Hudson River
Bridge Co., reported in 84 N.Y., 56 ;- "It was incumbent upon
the plaintiff to show affirmatively that the negligence of
the defendant was the sole cause of the death of the deceas-
ed. But it needs not that this be done by the positive and
direct evidence of the negligence of the defendant and of
the freedom from negligence of the deceased. The proofs may
be indirect, and the evidence had by showing circumstances
from which the inference is fairly to be drawn that these
principal and essential facts existed."
Sub. 6. The latest cases.
Lee vs. Troy Citizens Gas Light Co., 98 N.Y. 115. In
this case it was first contended that the complaint was in-
sufficient because it nowhere alleged the absence of contri-
butory negligence. The court, Finch J. delivering the opin-
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ion, says : "Such separate and direct averment in the plead-
ing,however, was unnecessary as held in Hackford vs. N.Y. C.
R.R. Co. ; aff'r 53 N.Y. 654 ; for such allegation is sub-
stantially always involved in the averment that the injury
set out was occasioned by the defendant's negligence. To
prove that, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, and
the burden is upon him to establish, that his own negligence
did not cause or contribute to the injury"; citing Hale vs.
Smith, 78 N.Y. 480.
And again in the case of Tolman vs. The Syracuse, Bing-
hamton & N.Y. R.R. Co., 98 N.Y. 198, reversing 31 Hun. 397,
the same judge sitting as the court, says ; "In an action for
negligence causing death, the burden of establishing affir-
marively freedom from contributory negligence is upon the
plaintiff ; and while, although there were no eye witnesses
of the accident, and although its precise cause and manner
of occurrence are unknown, absence of contributory negli -
gence may be established, sufficiently to make it a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, by proof of such facts and sur-
rounding circumstances as reasonably indicate or tend to
establish that the accident might have occurred without neg-
ligence on part of defendant. Yet if the facts and circum-
stances, coupled with the occurrence of the accident, do not
indicate or tend to establish the existence of some cause or
occasion therefor which is consistent with proper care and
prudence, the inference of negligence is the only one to be
92
drawn, and defendant is entitled to a non-suit! And the
learned judge, disagreeing with the General Term, fur-
ther held that the burden was upon the plaintiff of showing
affirmatively,either by direct evidence or the drift of sur-
rounding circumstances, that the deceased was himself with-
out fault, and approached the crossing with prudence and
care, and with senses alert to the possibility of approach-
ing danger. On the ground that there was no evidence di-
rect or inferential of the exercise of such care and prudence
by the deceased, the evidence leaves no rational grounds
for any other inference than one of neglect and want of care.
In this case, the intestate early in the evening was approac-
ing a crossing over defendant's tracks with his horse and
Eutter on his way from Syracuse to his house. Evidence was
given tending to show that at a distance of over one hundred
feet from the rails one could, in daylight, see the tracks
in the direction from which the train camefor a long dis-
tance. It appeared on the trial that the night was dark,
foggy and misty, and that it was impossible to see far, or
to hear distant sounds. The charge of the lower court that
it is only when it appears from the evidence that a traveler
might have seen had he looked, or he might have heard had he
listened, that the jury in the absence of evidence upon the
question is authorized to find that he did not look and lis-
ten, was accordingly overruled, judgment reversed and new
trial granted.
Section V.-- The Ohio Doctrine.
In Robeson vs. Gay, 28 Ohio St. 241, Day J., speaking
for the court, says : "It is only when the injury is shown
by the plaintiff, and there is nothing that implies that his
own negligence contributed to it, that the burden of proving
contributory negligence can properly be said to be cast on
the defendant ; for when the plaintiff's own case raises the
sus, icion that his own negligence contributed to the injury,
the presumption of the care on his part is so far removed
that he cannot properly be relieved from disproving his own
contributory negligence by casting the burden of proving it
on the defendant. ..... The question should be left
upon the whole evidence to the determination of the jury,
with the instruction that the plaintiff cannot recover, if
his own negligence contributed to the injury."
And in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., vs. Whitacre, 35
Oh. 627, this doctrine was substantially upheld in the fol-
lowing terms-- "In an action for an injury, occasioned by
negligence, where the circumstances require of the plaintiff
the exercise of due care to avoid the injury, and his tes-
timony does not disclose any want of such care on his part,
the burden is on defendant to show such contributory negli-
gence as will defeat a recovery. But if plaintiff's own
testimony in support of his cause of action raises a presunp-
tion of such contributory negligence, the burden rests upon
him to remove that presumption." This doctrine is ap-
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proved in the later case of Cincinnati Street Railway Co., vs
Nolthenius, 40 Ohio St., 376.
Section VI.-- The Pennsylvania Cases.
In this jurisdiction there are adjudications sustaining
both views.
Baker vs. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co., App.
157 Penn. 593. This casedecided in 1893,involved the ques-
tion of defendant's negligence, causing the injury complained
of, and also contributory negligence of the legal plaintiff.
One of the specifications alleging error, charged that the
court erred in refusing to affirm defendant's third point,
which was as follows : "The plaintiff in this case, before
he can recover, must show that the loss resulted solely
from the negligence of the defendant company, and that Mrs.
Baker (the plaintiff) in no way contributed to her own loss
by her own negligence". In the opinion by Mr. Chief
Justice Sterrett, it was held no error in the court's an-
swer to defendant's point as recited above. "The vice of
of the point, as presented," says the learned judge, "is that
it puts upon the plaintiff the burden of proving a negative,
viz.; 'that Mrs. Baker in no way contributed to her own loss
by her own negligence.' Contributory negligence is a mat-
ter of defense, and the onus probandi is on the defendant,
unless the plaintiff's own evidence sufficiently discloses
the fact of contributory negligence. In that event, the
plaintiff cannot recover, and of course defendant is reliev-
ed from necessity of proving what has already been establish
ed by the plaintiff's evidence. If, however, the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case, without disclosing contribu-
tory negligence, the defendant must assume the burden of mak-
ing out his defense Canal Co. vs. Bentley, 56 Pa. 30, 33.
But several of the late decisions hold that it is the
duty of plaintiff to show that he was exercising proper care.
In Baker vs. Fehr, 97 Penn. 70, the marginal note states,
that, "In an action for death or injury alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the defendant, the burden is
upon plaintiff to prove that the negligence of the defendat
caused the death or injury, without contributory negligence
on the part of the person killed or injured." This rule
was upheld in Phil. & Reading R.R. Co., vs. Bayer reported
in the same volume at 91.
Section VII.-- The rule in Vermont.
In this state there is no settled doctrine, but the
majority of the holdings place the burden on the defendant.
Hill Vs. Town of New Haven, 37 Vt. 501. In this case the
defendant claimed that affirmative proof of the plaintiff's
intestate's conduct and management on the occasion was care -
ful and prudent ; or that he was not guilty of negligence or
imprudence, was necessary in order to make out a prima facie
case for the plaintiff.
Poland ch. J. says : "We do not consider this proposi-
tion strictly correct ; that in this class of cases for inju-
ries caused ny insufficient highways, that the plaintiff is
bound to establish as a distinct affirmative point in the out-
set that he was not guilty of negligence or want of care in
his own conduct or management, in order to show an apparent
right of recovery . .... This is a question as to the
burden of proof merely ; is the plaintiff bound to establish
in the outset, as a distinct affirmative proposition that he
was guilty of no negligence on the occasion ? We think
he is not. The defect in the highway being conceded or
proved, the plaitniff is bound to give sufficient evidence
to establish prima facie, that he sustained an injury by
reason of such defect. . . . . . If the plaintiff's proof
discloses nothing but that his conduct at the time was proper
and prudent, he is not bound to go farther, until this has
been impugned by some evidence on the other side."
The true rule on this subject was laid down by PhelpsJ.,
in the early case of Lester vs. Pittsford, 7 Vt., 158, where
he says : "It was not incumbent on the plaintiff to negative
the charge of negligence or imprudence on his part, such
proof being properly matter of defense." Nor is it to be
understood that what is said in the case of Barber vs. Essex
21 Vt., 62 by Redfield ch. J., there is substantially from
what is here held : in that case a special request was made
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upon the court to charge that the burden was upon the plain-
tiff to show that he was exercising due care at the time the
accident occurred, and it is to be noticed that though the
request was not complied with, still the judgment was affirm-
ed .
CHAPTER VI.
SUMMARY
Section I. Objections to the rule contrary to the
general doctrine.
It is not here intended to undertake a refutation
of the doctrine holding contrary to what has been shown
to be the general rule. It may be briefly urged in
objection upon this point that inasmuch as it is essen-
tially a question of public policy, it is a harsh rule
that requires a person to first show affirmatively the
exercise of due and proper care on his part and the
absence of contributory negligence, before the party
who has inflicted this injury can be compelled to
respond to his liability.
Moreover this question of expediency and general
convenience was decided in the early adjudications
which established the doctrine of presumption of inno-
cence in the criminal law. ]That was and still is good
sound public policy in those cases, it is possible, is
not policy in any sense now, and so Beach would have
us think. But conceding that the jurists were correct
in their divination of those sound principles, which
were sustained at the time when the Butlerfield case
was decided, no change in the position of human affairs
so extraordinary has occurred, we think will be admitted,
as will warrant such a rudical departure as some of the
courts have seen fit to adopt. It is undisputably the
rule of justice and humanity. Its intrinsic force
and reasonableness is certainly shown by the decisions
of the highest tribunals of both England and America
whose importance can not be considered of too great
weight. And further to require a plaintiff (in addition
to establishing the sufficiency of the negligent act of
the defendant to produce the injury and their relation
to each other as proximate cause and effect), to nega-
tive a possible defense by either an averment in the com-
plaint of his freedom from contributory negligence,
with proof of such fact, or by affirmative proof alone
would be to disregard an established, elementary rule
of pleading and evidence. There are no rules of evi-
dence based upon surer and Juster grounds of equity and
good sense, than that which casts the burden of proof
in every controversy upon that party who maintains the
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affirmative, whether said fact be to sustain the action
or bar a recovery.
It is in consequence of the fact that the complaint
in an action for negligence may and often does contain
the averment that the injury was caused by negligence
of defendant without any fault or negligence on part of
the plaintiff ; that the plaintiff has been supposed to
necessarily offer some affirmative evidence of the ab-
sence of negligence on his part, in the first instance.
But such is not the case, for as in the absence of
evidence of defendant's negligence, the defendant is
absolved from liability, so in the absence of evidence
of plaintiff's contributory negligence, should he be
free to recover. Accordingly, then, when a defendant
relies upon such defense, whether the averment in respect
thereto appear negatively or affirmatively, such con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff must be shown
by the evidence or the defense will be of no avail.
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Section II. The reasoning of the Massachusetts and
New York doctrine.
It is clear in our mind that this exception to the
rule that the onus probandi in cases of contributory
negligence is upon the defendant, had its origin in the
common law in the case of Butterfield v. Forrester,in
England, and in Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621, in the
United States. We shall look in vain in the reports
of either country for any earlier adjudications bearing
upon this subject. Upon a close examination of the
doctrine as adopted in the first Massachusett decision,
we ascertain that no reasons were given to show the
justice or propriety of such a rule ; it was rested
neither upon argument nor analogy but upon the adjuca-
tions of Butterfield v. Forrester, and Flower v. Adam,
2 Taunt 214 which the court held itself bound to follow.
The case first cited as authority, already discussed
supra as a further review here with the other case, may
be briefly summarized as proving, not that a person is
unable to recover unless he shows affirmatively that
there was no want of ordinary care on his part as could
have contributed to the accident, but merely, that when
it appears by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff,
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that by the exercise of ordinary care he might have
avoided the accident, he is not permitted to recover.
In the first proposition the negligence which is a bar
to recovery is, without proof, presumed to have occurred, in
the second, it is proved. And so, as the decisions
in the early Massachusett cases have no adequate support
from authority, they have also been shown to have none
from reason or analogy.
A consideration and scrutiny of the later cases
of both jurisdictions will show that the doctrine as
first upheld has been gradually lessened in its severity
upon the plaintiff until it no more exacts that he
should prove due care on his part by direct affirmative
evidence. The inference of such care, it is held, may
be drawn from the absence of all ap:earance of fault,
either positive or negative, on his part in the circum-
stances under which the injury was received.
And further, as is seen in the recent case of
Copley v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 136 Mass. 6, a
statutory exemption as to the plaintiff's proof is
enacted in the cases of injury received by a person
being run over and killed at a place where a highway
crossed the defendant's railroad at a grade ; the court
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in that case holding that the burden of proof was upon
the defendant to show that plaintiff was guilty of gross
or wilful negligence in addition to want of ordinary
care. Also where person injured is a pzssenger, the
burden is, by force of statute, placed upon defendant to
show that deceased was negligent. And in most of the
jurisdictions where the same rule prevails, like enact-
ments modify the harshness of the doctrine;
Section III. Text Writers as to solution of the
Question. Conclusion.
A great deal of speculative discussion is to be
observed in the texts of the early writers upon the
subject of contributory negligence and a variety of
opinions was the result. Some held that the entire bur-
den was upon the plaintiff ; others maintained that
no general rule should prevail, but that each case
should be a rule unto itself ; while the largest number,
without using any abstruse or subtle reasoning in
arriving at their conclusion, sustain and support the
more rational doctrine so ably advocated by Professor
Wharton that"the plaintili by his negligence so contri-
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buted to the injury as to break the causal connection
between such injury and the defendant's act, is a
matter of defense, which, in the ordinary process of
proof, it is incumbent on the defendant to make out."
In the opinion of the author, after a careful examina-
tion of all the authorities- in addiLion -o the many
adjudication on this point, no entirely satisfactory
reason for the exception to the general rule is to be
found.
The early reported cases simply apply the funda-
mental rule of the Roman Law governing recovery in
cases of this general character, and so our research has
necessarily been confined to the present century.
But, while the origin of the rule is not far to seek,
its development from 1809 down to the present time, we
humbly submit the opinion, can be far better appre-
ciated by the practitioner from a study of -he adjudi-
cations in England and America herein collected and re-
viewed, than from any views we might be tempted to ad-
vance in our capacity as a thesis writer.
4Shearman and Redfield on Contributory Negligence.
